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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationships between NCAA  schools’ total athletic revenues and 
the revenues generated by individual sports, the scholarship money given to male and female 
athletes, the expenses of men and women’ sports, and the recruiting expenses associated them. 
By using the data from the 2016-2017 academic year, provided to the Office of Postsecondary 
Education of the U.S. Department of Education under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, this 
thesis adds to the growing library of sports economic literature. The idea of compensation for 
college athletes is one that has been discussed for many years, but very few have taken the time 
to determine how schools make their money and what factors have a positive effect on revenue, 
outside of the individual sports themselves. By using an ordinary least squares regression model, 
I was able to determine that for every dollar a school spends on women’s athletic scholarships 
total revenue increases by $8.435; for every dollar spent on women’s sports, revenue increases 
by $2.32 when spent on women’s sports; lastly, for every dollar spent on women’s recruiting, 
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Introduction 
Often overlooked in the minds of those outside of the sporting world, the National 
Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA)  is quickly making the case to be brought into the 
conversation as one of the most profitable sports leagues, not only in the United States but in the 
world. Although much further behind all other major US professional sports leagues, the NCAA 
pulled in $1 billion in revenue for the 2016-2017 academic year (Parker, 2018). When compared 
to the “Big 4” of American sports, the NFL($13 billion);  MLB($9.5 billion);  the NBA ($4.8 
billion); and the NHL ($3.7 billion), $1 billion in revenue seems to show that there is still much 
more progress to be made (Kutz 2016). However, when the philosophy of “amateurism” is taken 
into consideration, $1 billion in revenue raises many questions about the treatment of the men 
and women to help create the revenue.  
  In the last few years, the American sports media has paid considerable attention to the 
rights of American athletes. Their freedoms of speech and expression, their right to choose who 
they work for and how they work, and also their ability to choose how much is a fair salary have 
all been called into question. However, despite all of the attention professional athletes have 
brought to these issues, one issue that is often overlooked is whether or not college athletes 
should be paid. Given their status as college students, it has become easy for media personalities 
and those who have no experience in an athletic environment to quickly dismiss the argument. 
“They receive a free education” has become the easiest defense to hide behind. Considering the 
economics behind revenue-generating sports such and football and basketball, in addition to the 
common low-income status of athletes upon their enrollment to their respective universities, this 
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I believe that the data produced by this paper can provide valuable insight into how the 
generated revenue and student aid of the respective 126 FBS universities are affected by the 
major sports on campus. Within this topic, there have been a plethora of scholarly articles 
written, but very few have taken the time to look at the raw data and revenues generated over the 
past few years.  
Using an ordinary least squares regression model, I established a linear relationship 
between a number of different athletic factors and the total athletic revenue of 126 universities in 
the United States. The data produced by the ordinary least squares model produced a number of 
results showing how, and to what extent, a university makes money for their athletic department. 
The first model I ran showed that the success of a school’s football and basketball programs, 
both men’s and women’s, will ultimately determine the overall financial success of the athletic 
department. At the same time, on average, women’s sports themselves have a negative effect on 
overall revenue of a school’s athletic department, but spending money on athletic scholarships 
and women’s sports have an overall positive effect on total revenue. Lastly, the recruiting 
expenses of individual universities do not prove to be a factor in overall revenue, but a high 
coefficient on women’s recruiting expenses may provide some insight into the disparity of 
competition within women’s sports.  
The rest of this paper is written as follows. A literature review based on previous research 
and is followed by data, methodology, and empirical results. Finally, the paper closes with a 
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Literature Review 
The rise of college athletics in the United States has produced a form of entertainment not 
seen anywhere else in the world. What was once an extracurricular activity for college students 
has become a billion dollar a year industry.  Since its inception in 1906, the National Collegiate 
Athletics Association (NCAA) has been tasked with regulating the actions of more than 1,200 
universities around the country and the student-athletes that attend them. The term 
“student-athlete” is a phrase coined by the NCAA. Its original intent was to simply describe 
athletes on college campuses, because, as students, their main focus was on academics, with 
sports playing a secondary role. Despite its original intent, according to Robert and Amy 
McCormick, the term has taken on a new and much greedier meaning: “By creating and fostering 
the myth that football and men's basketball players at Division I universities are something other 
than employees, the NCAA and its member institutions obtain the astonishing pecuniary gain 
and related benefits of the athletes' talents, time, and energy-that is, their labor-while severely 
curtailing the costs associated with such labor.” (McCormick pg. 74). This definition of 
“student-athlete” has become a mainstream term as more and more professional athletes, in 
addition to those who did not turn professional, speak out against it. 
In order to gain an understanding of how to approach this topic, researchers first look at 
the definition and traditional relationship of employees and employers. In Texas, courts generally 
analyze the relationship using a “control test” and a “relative nature of work test” (Roberts 
pg.1322). These tests look at both the power structure within a business in addition to how 
substantial an employee’s workload is. In many sports, football in particular, athletes face serious 
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Supreme Court ruled in favor of the former Denver football player and stated that he was entitled 
to workers’ compensation after sustaining an injury during practice. Ten years later, in the case 
of ​Van Horn vs. Industrial Accident Commission​, a California court of appeals followed the 
Nemeth decision and rewarded compensation to the family of a deceased football player after he 
died in a plane crash when returning from a game (Roberts, 2006, pg. 1329). These cases are 
intriguing because they both took place well before the commercialization of college sports. ​The 
University of Denver vs Nemeth​ took place in 1953, and the Van Horn case a decade later. 
Rather than view these two court rulings as a sign of what the future may hold, the 
NCAA stood their ground and did nothing to avoid future conflicts. In fact, according to ​Walter 
Byers (the first executive director of the NCAA) and Charles Hammer, the NCAA had double 
downed on the “student-athlete” label. Leading up to and continuing throughout the 1990s, the 
NCAA reemphasized that players were only “amateurs,” they adopted more rules that negatively 
affected athletes, they established a centralized bureaucracy, and they beefed up public relations 
campaigns to sway public opinion into believing the “virtues” of college athletics and that the 
power rested solely in the hands of college presidents (Byers & Hammer, 1998,  pgs. 1-2). 
Byers, despite being the NCAA’s first executive director, was incredibly critical of the 
machine he helped create during the later years of his life. He became the NCAA’s first full-time 
employee at the age of only 29, and quickly helped turn the organization into the money making 
machine it is today. He helped establish the NCAA’s enforcement division in an effort to punish 
schools and coaches who broke the NCAA’s rules. At the same time, he helped negotiate the 
television rights deals for colleges’ football teams and for events such as the March Madness 
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The television rights, it can be argued, helped turn the NCAA into what it is known as 
today. For years, Byers was focused on maintaining “amateurism.” He wanted the NCAA to 
stand for original principles it was founded on. So when he negotiated the original television 
contracts for the NCAA, he limited the amount of exposure of each of the schools. Americans 
would not be able to see their favorite schools on television every week. Byers purposely did this 
to maintain the “student-athlete” label of the players on the field. At the same time, universities 
were not allowed to receive any portion of the agreements between the networks and the NCAA.  
Despite Byer’s best efforts, the universities began to realize the true value of their athletic 
departments. So, on March 20, 1984, the NCAA was brought before the Supreme Court by the 
universities in a lawsuit alleging that the television rights deal negotiated by Byers, that lasted 
from 1981 to 1985, was illegal. On June 2, 1984, the Court ruled that the television broadcasting 
rights deal between the NCAA, ABC, and CBS Broadcasting Networks violated the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. (NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)). They concluded that the deal 
constituted “price fixing” and that it placed an artificial limit on live college football being 
broadcasted in the United States. As a result, universities and conferences were then given free 
rein to negotiate their own deals and allowed their schools to be broadcasted live every weekend. 
This court decision has given rise to things such as conference devoted television networks and 
an endless selection of college football games broadcasted on dozens of networks every 
weekend. As it currently sits, the University of Notre Dame, given its independent conference 
status, is the only school in the country to have negotiated its own exclusive television rights. 
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2013, their partnership has been extended through the 2025 football season and the financial 
terms of the deal remain undisclosed (Associated Press 2013). 
This decision was seen as a huge blow for the NCAA and even Byers, after years of 
promoting amateurism, began to question the direction of the league. In an interview with famed 
sports writer Jack McCallum shortly after the decision, Byers was quoted as saying “You know, 
I've reached the point where I've started thinking about an open division, to make it more, for 
want of a better word, professional” (Given 2017). His about-face on the topic was met with 
harsh resistance and he was forced to sit before the NCAA council to explain himself. The 
sudden about-face and new business model allowed for corruption and greed to spread 
throughout the universities and the conferences as the money began to pour in.  
Byers ultimately retired from the NCAA in 1988 and aired out the grievances against his 
former employer in his 1995 memoir “​Unsportsmanlike Conduct.​” In it, he talks about how the 
NCAA came up with the term “student-athlete,” and how it ultimately became embedded in the 
NCAA’s philosophy (Branch 2014). The cases of ​The University of Denver vs Nemeth​ and ​Van 
Horn vs. Industrial Accident Commission ​helped give rise to the mainstream and legal use of the 
term. By adopting the term “student-athlete” into its philosophy, the NCAA gave itself a shield 
and a justification for its treatment of the athletes. The term became purposefully ambiguous. 
The groups of athletes on the field are composed of men and women who serve a dual purpose. 
They are not strictly athletes, nor are they strictly students. They are somewhere in the middle. 
Their status as athletes means they would be forgiven for low academic performances, but their 
status as students means they are exempt from any form of compensation. Despite his best effort 
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no book tour, nor was he called in front of Congress to expose the corruption. The book has sat 
mostly irrelevant in the realm of mainstream sports literature until his death in 2015. 
The debate has since moved into the 21​st​ century and had picked up mainstream 
popularity due to the case of ​Ed O’Bannon vs NCAA​. Unlike the cases mentioned earlier, the 
O’Bannon case, as it has come to be known, is not about workers’ compensation due to injury, 
but rather revenue sharing and whether or not the NCAA has the right to use a player’s image 
and likeness for commercial purpose. O’Bannon brought the lawsuit against the NCAA, and later 
on Electronic Arts (EA), when he noticed that, in an NCAA video game, a player on the UCLA 
basketball team, his alma mater, wore the same jersey number, played the same position, and had 
the same physical features as he did. O’Bannon saw this as a clear attempt to represent himself 
without explicitly putting his name on it. At the end of a 5-year legal battle, a settlement was 
reached where thousands of former college football and basketball players were entitled to 
compensation for their representation in NCAA video games. In addition, the court ruled that the 
NCAA may no longer use any current or former player’s image or likeness within a video game 
for commercial purposes (Edelman, 2014, pg. 2325). As a result, the beloved NCAA video game 
franchise, in both football and basketball, was ended. This case brought the topic into the 
mainstream not only because of its importance to collegiate athletes, but because it affected 
millions of people who never stepped foot on a collegiate field. 
Despite the discontinuation of the NCAA video game franchise, the NCAA continues to 
have a number of revenue sources away from the field of play. As mentioned previously, 
television rights have become the main driver of income for both the NCAA and individual 
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CBS Sports and Turner Broadcasting for the rights to broadcast the March Madness Tournament. 
This tournament is an American spectacle every year and represents the largest portion of the 
NCAA’s annual revenue. Of the $1 billion in revenue the NCAA makes a year, approximately 
90% of that money is directly related to the March Madness Tournament. This is due, in part to 
the 14 year, $10.8 billion contract they have with CBS and Turner Broadcasting that was signed 
in 2010  (Parker 2018). That deal was also extended in April 2016 through 2032, adding an 
additional $8.8 billion to the existing deal.  According to the NCAA, 96% of the money collected 
each year is distributed to the universities that are a member of the Division I ranks. 
The payout for the tournament, however, is the closest thing the NCAA has to paying out 
based on athletic performance. At the beginning of the 2016 tournament, there was a 
$220,000,000 money pot. Each conference received a percentage of that pot based on the number 
of teams in the tournament and how far each team went. The payout is then spread out over six 
seasons. Each conference gets a $1,700,000 payout for each team that it has in the tournament. 
The further a team goes, the higher the additional payout. If a team makes it to the finals, it can 
earn either five or six payments, depending on their starting place, totaling $8,300,000. 
Conferences are encouraged to evenly distribute the money amongst the universities but are not 
required to. Larger conferences like the Big 10 or ACC, who have multiple streams of revenue, 
are more like to follow the NCAA’s recommendations, than a smaller, lesser-known conference. 
For the small conferences, the “Cinderella team,” as they have come to be known, can represent 
a huge source of funding for an otherwise unprofitable conference.  
In addition to television rights, merchandising has become another huge revenue stream 
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other national retail stores have extended the reach of universities in an effort to attract new fans. 
At the same time, sponsorship deals with Nike, Under Armour, and Adidas allow the universities 
to take the field with the newest, and most cutting edge uniforms, designed for peak performance 
and most futuristic designs. Revenue from these partnerships can sometimes reach up to 5% of 
an athletic department’s revenue  (Kleinman 2018).  These sponsorships help attract new fans 
and also promote the sale of jerseys and other merchandise to people who are not even fans of 
the schools’ teams, they just like the design.  
Despite the economic benefits, like most things the NCAA does, merchandising does not 
come without its controversies. Much like the Ed O’Bannon case, college merchandising has 
been pulled into the question of how universities are unethically using and profiting off the 
images of their athletes. For a long time, the NCAA, the universities, and the global 
merchandising brands they partnered with would sell officially licensed jerseys online for fans to 
buy. The jerseys, however, would change every year. The jersey number would change from 
year to year to represent the top player on each team, but the nameplate would remain empty. For 
example, Nike would sell number 8 jerseys with no name on them for the University of Oregon. 
Although the jersey carried no name on the back, it was obvious that the jersey was fashioned to 
represent the 2014 Heisman winner Marcus Mariota. Each year the universities would update the 
jerseys being sold after the athletes have graduated to represent the new face of their program.  
Thanks to the O’Bannon case, universities began to limit the jerseys available to 
consumers as the case shed new light on the situation. “I think most people understand the 
landscape has changed a little bit, and we need to be smart,” said Mississippi State senior 
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become more self-aware and are taking precautionary measures before they are forced to 
compensate those who they have previously wronged.  
Currently, fans are only able to purchase jersey bearing the number 1, or bearing the year 
(Ex. 18 for 2018) that the jersey was purchased. Despite some schools making the change, other 
schools have refused to change their distribution habits based on the feedback of both current 
and former players who want their jerseys sold, even if they don’t receive any compensation. 
The players sign permission forms to allow for their likeness to be used. 
In addition to the “use of player likeness” controversy, Adidas and the University of 
Louisville became embroiled in their own controversy, when a bribery scheme was discovered 
involving Adidas employees, Louisville coaches, and high school recruits.  The deal between 
Adidas and Louisville was a 10-year agreement that included: “$79 million in cash payments, 
$61.3 million in merchandise, $16 million in ‘activation funds’ for such purposes as internships 
and strategic brand initiatives and $4.5 million in guaranteed royalties” (Sullivan 2018). The 
terms of the deal, specifically money allocated for “activation funds” were purposefully 
ambiguous. The University and Adidas claimed that it was written that way because they had not 
come to a conclusion as to the specific use of the money. However, in an indictment by a New 
York grand jury, eight people with connections Louisville and Adidas were using the money to 
sway the opinions of recruits into signing with Louisville to play basketball (Sayers & Lerner 
2017).  
Despite the amount of money the NCAA and its universities make, there have been very 
few empirical studies done into how these revenue sources fit into the topic of athletic 
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Association, and Drexel sports management professor​ Ellen J. Staurowsky, outlined how much 
money in fair market value they believe athletes have been forfeiting over the past decade. In 
their study, Huma and Staurowsky concluded a number of findings in their study, the first major 
finding being that despite the “full scholarships” athletes may receive, the aid provided by the 
university still puts students at an annual scholarship shortfall of $3,285. Secondly, the 
scholarship shortfalls cause between 80% and 90% of athletes to fall below the federal poverty 
line, depending on whether or not they live on campus. Lastly, if allowed to access the free 
market and capitalize off their images, the average FBS football and basketball player would be 
work approximately $137,357 and $289,031, respectively (Huma and Staurowsky 2012). 
The findings by Huma and Staurowsky are only estimated values. There are still many 
other factors to consider, such as personal endorsement deals and the school they attend, but the 
evidence is still telling. By looking at the NFL’s and NBA’s revenue sharing models that the 
respective league put in place. Huma and Staurowsky were able to estimate these values that 
students have forfeited. In the end, they estimate that college athletes have been cheated out of 
more than $6.2 billion in fair profits based on the revenue they helped generate. Their policy 
recommendation suggests that the Department of Justice pursue a series of antitrust lawsuits 
against the NCAA, allow universities to make up the scholarship shortfalls, allow athletes to 
explore their own commercial opportunities, and to the extent of Title IX, allow these benefits to 
extend across sports off all genders and revenue generating capabilities. 
Given the push back the NCAA has received, this past September, they have put into 
place a new set of rules giving college basketball players more freedoms in regards to the college 
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The reason they focused on basketball is that men's college basketball players only have to play 
for one season at their school before turning professional.  
The first piece of flexibility the NCAA has offered is focused on high school students. 
The NCAA has granted prospective student more “official visits” that can be taken prior to their 
junior year of high school. In addition, high school students have been given the freedom to 
become represented by an agent, if and when the NBA lifts the restriction on entering the NBA 
straight out of high school.  
In regards to college players, the NCAA has also granted them the ability to become 
represented by an agent once that player requests an evaluation from the NBA Undergraduate 
Advisory Committee. Once that request has been put through, agents are allowed to cover all 
expenses in regards to the agent selection process. Once an agent has been signed, all fees in 
relation to visiting professional teams or the agent themselves are allowed to be paid by the 
agent. The contract between a player and agent becomes void if a player either enrolls in college 
out of high school or re-enrolls after the NBA Draft. 
The last area of focus the NCAA has focused on is in relations to the NBA Draft and 
beyond. Previously, once a player declared for the Draft, that player officially unenrolled from 
their university and their athletic scholarship becomes void. With their new rules, the NCAA 
now allows players to return to their universities if not selected in the Draft. For those who are 
selected, the NCAA will now allow them to return to their respective schools to complete their 
degree and have their tuition paid by the university, if it has been less than 10 years since they 
left. The NCAA has also set up a fund for schools who are unable to cover these costs 
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Data 
In order to conduct my research, I used data published by the Office of Postsecondary 
Education of the U.S. Department of Education. Under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act of 
1994, universities across the country are required to “​d​isclose gender participation rates and 
program support expenditures in college athletic programs to prospective students and, upon 
request, to the public”​ (​Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act of 1994). Using this data, I was able to 
collect the revenues, expenses, coaching salaries, and student aid of 126 FBS level schools. 
These variables were then added to my model and regressed against the total revenue of the 
universities to establish a linear relationship. The results of the model will help me to understand 
which sports make the most money for their athletic departments, in addition to determining how 
different spending habits also affect total revenue. Using these results, recommendations can be 
brought forward in order to determine what kind of compensatory system, if any, can be 
established that is fair to both the revenue generating and non-revenue generating sports.  
Table 1 provides the number of observations, means, standard deviations, minimums and 
maximums of all the data used collected from the Department of Education. In order to 
investigate factors that affect the revenues of college athletic departments, data from the 
2016-2017 academic years was used. Under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA), all 
colleges are required to report information that the government sees as vital to ensure the fair 
treatment of student-athletes across all sports and genders to the Office of Postsecondary 
Education of the U.S. Department of Education. In turn, the government makes this data 
available, annually, to the public through the ​OPE Equity in Athletics Disclosure Website 
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The relationships between the selected variables were determined by using an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model. The OLS model uses a set of explanatory variables to produce an 
estimated linear relationship. Those relationships are calculated by minimizing the sum of 
squares differences between the observed and predicted values. Given the output, a level of 
significance can be determined by a variable's p-value. P-values less than .05, in a 95% 
confidence test, show that the given variable has a significant effect, whether positive or 
negative, on the dependant variable.  
In order to effectively analyze the data and relate it back to the topic of athletic 
compensation, a number of steps had to be taken to narrow the data. The first step taken was to 
narrow down the number of schools. Under the NCAA’s umbrella, there are more than 1,200 
universities that compete in some form of competitive athletics. Of those 1,200 schools, only 126 
compete at the “football bowl subdivision” (FBS) level. These 126 schools have the highest 
regarded athletic programs in the country. They attract the top athletes from all over the country 
to compete for them, many of whom hope to turn professional. It is because of this level of 
competition that these schools athletic programs, particularly football and basketball, generate 
millions of dollars in revenue. Despite these two revenue-generating sports, as they are widely 
referred to, the high level of competition stretches across all sports and genders.  
It is important to note, that in looking at the revenue and expense data of each of the 
universities, the accounting practices of the universities must be called into question. Of the 126 
schools, 63 schools (exactly half) reported a profit for the 2016-2017 year, while the other 63 
schools broke even. It is highly unlikely that no schools in the sample lost money on their 
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programs and the universities, costs incurred by the athletic departments are easily transferable to 
the school and do not appear as costs to the schools' programs. This practice is known as 
transfer-price accounting and does not help present an accurate representation of the spending 
habits of university athletic departments.  
After pulling out the top 126 schools, 5 individual sports were chosen to be the focus of 
the regression: football, men’s and women’s basketball, men’s and women’s track, softball, and 
baseball. These 5 sports are routinely amongst the top revenue sources for school athletic 
departments but are also the most even against both genders. The final step that was taken was 
determining the most important factors provided by the OPE Equity in Athletics Disclosure 
website. In the end, it was determined that total revenue, total expenditure, student enrollment by 
gender, participation by sport, head coaching salaries by gendered sport, athletic aid by gender, 
revenue generated by sport, and expenditures by sports and gender were all likely to be the key 
factors that have an effect on a school’s revenue. In addition to the variables taken straight from 
the OPE Equity in Athletics Disclosure website, another series of variables were created using 
the data to help create a more complete model. Athletic aid per capita was calculated by dividing 
total athletic aid by the total number of athletes. Athletic aid as a percentage of revenue and total 
revenue after financial aid were also variables that were calculated. Lastly, a control variable for 
the state a university is located in was created by associating a quantifiable variable with each of 
the states in the sample data. By doing this, biases towards certain sports for particular regions on 
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Models and Variables 
In order to conduct a thorough study of the wide range of factors, a base equation was 
developed to focus on the total revenue of the university and the revenue generated by each of 
the sports selected to the study to determine the linear relationship between them: 
(1) Totlrev ​= B​0​ + B​1​(​bsblrev​) + B​2 ​(​mbsktbl​) + B​3​(​wbsktbl​) + B​4 ​(​mtrackrev​) + B​5 ​(​wtrackrev​) + 
B​6​(​fbltrev​) + B​7​(​sftblrev​) + B​8​(​i.statename​) + ​u 
Total revenue of the schools’ athletic departments in 2016 was selected as the dependent variable 
because it is the starting point in the conversation related to athletic compensation. This was 
calculated by each of the 126 universities in their report to the Department of Education by 
adding the revenue of all sports the university offers, not just the sports that are the focus of this 
study. The independent variables of baseball revenue, men’s and women’s basketball revenue, 
men’s and women’s track revenue, football revenue, and softball revenue were all selected to 
help represent some of the school’s highest revenue generating sports. These sports are also the 
most balanced across both genders, with the exception of football, and help create a more 
complete representation of how athletic departments generate revenue. At the same time, 
i.statename​ was generated in order to control for the states the universities are located in. The 
reason for this is because there is typically a bias across different states towards different sports. 
Southern states tend to prioritize outdoor sports, especially football, whereas northern states 
focus more on indoor sports, like basketball. Lastly, ​bigprogram ​was created in order to control 
for the larger schools in the sample. Of the 126 universities, the average revenue generated by an 
athletic department was approximately $73,000,000. The variable controls for schools that 
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those that earned above. As presented in the equation, it is believed that all sports will have a 
positive effect on a school’s athletic revenue. The reason for this hypothesis is because due to 
business-like mentality of athletic departments, they would more often than not suspend any 
sport that costs the school money. The results of this model will help determine which sports 
generate the most money for the schools and which are most deserving of a form of 
compensation. 
Following the creation of the base model, three more equations were created to test the 
effects of aid given to male and female athletes, the expenses of men’s and women’s sports, and 
the amount of money spent on recruiting male and female athletes on total revenue. The first 
equation is as follows: 
(2)  ​Totlrev ​= B​0​ + B​1​(​bsblrev​) + B​2 ​(​mbsktbl​) + B​3​(​wbsktbl​) + B​4 ​(​mtrackrev​) + B​5 ​(​wtrackrev​) + 
B​6​(​fbltrev​) + B​7​(​sftblrev​) + B​8​(​i.statename​) - B​9​(​menaid​) - B​10​(​womenaid​) + ​u 
The inclusion of men’s and women’s aid represents the amount of scholarship money a 
university distributes amongst its male and female athletes. The inclusion of aid into the model is 
very important because many people see the aid given to athletes as the only form of 
compensation that they should receive. In addition, I believe its inclusion will be able to prove 
whether or not schools would be able to create a compensatory system under the current system. 
If both coefficients are positive, then the results would suggest that the more money a school 
provides its athletes, the more money they generate. However, as presented in the model, I 
believe that the coefficients will be the opposite. Simply handing more money to student-athletes 
will not generate any revenue. Money spent on aid should not have any positive effect on 
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After looking at the effects of aid on total revenue, I then looked at the expenses of men’s 
and women's sports on the total revenue of a university. Model 3 shows the equation: 
(3)   Totlrev ​= B​0​ + B​1​(​bsblrev​) + B​2 ​(​mbsktbl​) + B​3​(​wbsktbl​) + B​4 ​(​mtrackrev​) + B​5​(​wtrackrev​) + 
B​6​(​fbltrev​) + B​7​(​sftblrev​) + B​8​(​i.statename​) + B​9​(​menexp​) + B​10​(​womenexp​) + ​u 
Unlike aid given to students, I believe that the expenses of men’s and women’s sports will have a 
positive effect on revenue. The reason for this hypothesis is based on how spending can give 
athletes a competitive advantage over their opponents. Field surfaces, cleats, jerseys, weight 
rooms, and healthy meals all play a pivotal role in the performance of athletes. By providing 
these essential needs to athletes, schools have a greater opportunity to maximize revenue and 
better prepare their athletes for competition. Models 2 and 3 will help determine how spending 
money on student-athletes affects revenue and how simply paying money out-of-pocket affects 
the revenue of the schools and if this type of compensatory system is sustainable.  
The last model takes into account the amount of money schools spend on recruiting for 
both mens and womens sports, represented by the following equation: 
(4)​   ​ Totlrev ​= B​0​ + B​1​(​bsblrev​) + B​2 ​(​mbsktbl​) + B​3​(​wbsktbl​) + B​4 ​(​mtrackrev​) + B​5 ​(​wtrackrev​) + 
B​6​(​fbltrev​) + B​7​(​sftblrev​) + B​8​(​i.statename​) + B​9​(​mensrecruit​) + B​10​(​womensrecruit​) + ​u 
In this model, I hypothesize that recruiting expenses will have a positive effect on total revenue. 
The reason for this hypothesis is because I believe that schools that spend more money recruiting 
attract the best athletes, in turn, improving programs. By spending money to connect with high 
school athletes, athletes become more connected with a university, and have a higher chance of 
going there. In addition to building relationships with athletes, spending money also gives 
schools the opportunity to build relationships with high school and club programs, establishing a 
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Empirical Results & Discussion 
After running a series of OLS regressions, the results in Table 2 report the effects of 
individual sports revenues, men’s and women’s aid, men’s and women’s expenditures, and 
men’s and women’s recruiting expenses have on a university’s total athletic revenue. The results 
indicate that football and men’s basketball will always have a significant effect on total revenue, 
no matter which variable is added to the equation.  
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As presented in the first column, both football and men’s basketball have a significant 
positive effect on total revenue. The level of significance of football and men’ and women’s 
basketball is of no real surprise given their popularity in America. With what we know about 
NCAA television rights, it is easy to assume that these two sports carry the highest demands 
amongst college athletics. Given the significance of men’s basketball, it is surprising that 
women’s basketball was not statistically significant at the 5% level, carrying a p-value 0.091, 
considering that television rights deals and other partnerships of that nature lump the men’s and 
women’s tournaments and games together. Its level of significance, however, is low in relations 
to the other variables and is also significant at the 10% level so I would still consider this 
variable’s value to be an important part of the results.  
The hypothesis for this equation was that all variables would have a positive coefficient, 
with the thought in mind that a school would shut down a program if it had a negative effect on 
total revenue. As produced in the results, women's track and softball were the only two variables 
to have a negative coefficient, with a statistically insignificant p-value of .845 and .756, 
respectively. The negative coefficients on women’s track revenue and softball, I believe, can 
play into a much larger discussion into the effects women’s sports in general play into an athletic 
department’s revenue. The coefficients on each of the state control variables vary between 
positive and negative. I believe that this variance may be explained by factors outside of athletics 
themselves, although all state variables did prove to be statistically insignificant. Lastly, the 
coefficient on ​bigprogram​ was both positive and statistically significant. I believe that this level 
of significance shows that the health of football and basketball programs are shown most in these 
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After running a regression on the base equation, men’s and women’s aid was included in 
the second model to account for the effect of scholarship money given to male and female 
athletes. Much like the base regression, football and men’s basketball carry high levels of 
significance in the model amongst the sports, with baseball now picking up significance. 
However, unlike the base model, women’s basketball now has an insignificant effect on total 
revenue, whereas the level of significance is now .903. The insignificance is surprising 
considering that the effect of women's aid on total revenue has a large positive coefficient of 
8.431 and a p-value of 0.009. As stated in the hypothesis, I was of the belief that both men’s and 
women’s aid would have a negative effect on total revenue. The negative coefficient on men’s 
aid reinforces the original belief that simply providing athletes more money will not increase a 
school's athletic revenue and that a simple out-of-pocket system to compensate athletes cannot be 
financially sustained. However, the statistical significance of the women’s aid variable had a 
positive coefficient of 8.431. I believe that this can also be explained through outside factors 
given the negative effects of women’s sports in the previous model. I believe that as advertisers 
and sponsors have become more focused on corporate social responsibility, they are more likely 
to partner with schools that provide more aid to their female athletes, and may even sponsor 
scholarships themselves, rather than partner simply based on revenue and exposure of men’s 
sports. At the same time, there is a clear gap between the revenues generated by women’s sports 
and the revenues generated by men’s sports. The large coefficient can most likely explain the 
variance in revenues of the top and average earning women’s programs 
The third model represents the expenditures of men’s and women’s sports. As in both 
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revenue. At the same time, there were also the only significant variables related to individual 
sports revenues. Women’s track continued to have a negative effect on total revenue, with a 
negative coefficient of 9.600. Unlike the inclusion of student aid, expenditures had a positive 
effect for both men and women, proving the original hypothesis correct. This positive effect can 
be reasoned by the fact that expenditures stretch far beyond the limits of scholarship money. 
Expenditures, for both men and women, have the ability to positively affect the direction of a 
school’s program, but only women’s expenditures was of statistical significance. Schools that 
invest in the best sports technology, equipment, and facilities have a better chance of putting 
better teams on the field than other schools do. Better facilities allow for athletes to train at a 
much higher level and be better prepared to face their opponents. At the same time, 
state-of-the-art facilities also have the ability to impress visiting recruits and allow teams to 
preserve or change  
The final regression model took into account the recruiting expenses of both men’s and 
women’s sports. The regression model carried many of the same characteristics as the first three. 
Men’s basketball and football both carried positive coefficients with statistical significance. 
Also, women’s track and softball continued to have a negative effect on total revenue. The 
positive coefficients on both recruiting expenses prove the original hypothesis to be true. Despite 
the positive coefficients, women’s recruiting expenses carried a very large coefficient of 49.16. 
This was the largest coefficient of any of the regressions run and can most likely be explained 
through the differences in recruiting expenses of different schools. Schools with top women’s 
programs spend a lot of money recruiting whereas those who do not have a very profitable 
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Conclusion & Policy Recommendation 
 
Given the results in this paper, a number of conclusions can be made in regard to the 
effects a number of variables have on an athletic department’s revenue and can be included into 
the very broad topic of college athletic compensation. In addition, a number of recommendations 
can be presented in order to allow for college athletes to properly receive the compensation they 
deserve, while still allowing universities to generate money. 
The first conclusion that can be made is that football and basketball will have the largest 
effects on a schools athletic revenue. As presented in the model, football and basketball both 
have a significant financial impact on an athletic department. Given what we know about the 
popularity of these sports in America, in addition to the television rights deals that the NCAA 
has entered to broadcast these sports, the results of the model make perfect sense and suggest 
that the individuals that participate in these sports deserve more compensation based on the 
revenue they generate.  
The second conclusion that can be made is that money spent is not necessarily money 
earned. We can see in the results of the second and third model that money spent on women’s 
sports and the scholarship money given to them both produce a positive effect on total revenue. 
These results are surprising considering the results of the first model which suggest that women’s 
sports, other than basketball, do not have a positive effect on total revenue. With that said, a 
compensatory system that forces schools to simply pay money out of revenue to both male and 
female athletes will most likely cause the athletic department to financially collapse. 
Lastly, if an effective system is put into place where athletes do earn the right to be 
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in fair value, so too must the disparity within women’s sports itself. In general, programs that 
spend a lot of money on recruiting are the most successful ones, generating more revenue. When 
looking at the coefficient on women’s recruiting we see an incredibly high one of 49.16. This 
coefficient leads me to believe that the most successful programs in women’s athletics are 
spending a lot of money, whereas the average and below average programs spend very little. 
This gap in women’s athletics must be taken into account to produce a fair value system. 
In terms of recommendations, the first one that I would make is to mandate NCAA 
colleges to change to a cash or accrual-based accounting system. By eliminating the possibility 
of using transfer-price accounting, universities will finally be able to produce an accurate 
representation of how they spend their money. In future academic years, athletic departments 
will be unable to hide any revenue generated or expenses incurred by transferring them to the 
university. 
A second recommendation that I would make to universities is to not spend money on a 
sport(s) based solely off of these results. Although the data shown does show a positive 
relationship between revenue and sports such as football and basketball, in addition to factors 
such as women’s scholarships, simply spending more money on a program will not produce an 
infinite amount of wealth. There are a number of athletic factors that must be taken into account, 
the most important being the quality of a team. We can clearly see in the model that spending 
money on women’s scholarships and women’s sports, in general, both have a positive effect on 
total revenue, even though the sports themselves do not. I believe that these can be explained 
through a number of outside factors not included in the model. Schools that see these results will 
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There is always room to improve in the sporting world but spending money is not always the 
answer. There is a large amount of luck that is involved and a university must not use finances as 
a way to compensate for bad luck. A school must spend within its means and not automatically 
assume that the money invested will have a net gain in the future.  
The final recommendation I would make is to allow college athletes to market 
themselves. Although not represented in the model, I believe that allowing the athletes to make 
themselves available to merchandising deals, commercials, autograph signings, etc. 
policymakers will be able to fully understand what the value of these athletes is. Under this 
system, the university sacrifices no out-of-pocket expenses and supports the claim, as presented 
in the model, that simply paying more money out to college athletes will not have an overall 
positive effect on revenue. Transferring money from the university to the athletes would only 
hurt the university rather than help it and could force the athletic program to shut down. 
Although it could be argued that the name of the university aids in the marketability of the 
athlete. It is here I believe to be the reason that the NCAA is so hesitant to move forward with a 
form of compensatory reform. The lost future benefits, in addition to the inability to capitalize 
off the athletes, are holding the NCAA back.  
It isn’t until companies decide what these students are worth that any further reform will 
be able to be taken. No university will be willing to pay hundreds of “student-athletes” an 
out-of-pocket salary. Even if they did, the chances that the salary does not meet the fair value is 
very high. By allowing athletes to market themselves, mostly football and basketball players, 
schools will then be able to turn their focus to “non-revenue generating sports.” The new shift in 
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mainstream sports, and can ultimately benefit sports programs across campus. 
Future studies of this topic can help provide a much more detailed representation of 
revenue generated by including all sports that universities offer, not just the 5 in this paper. 
Similarly, by expanding the scope to all 1,200 NCAA schools, researchers will be able to 
determine how, or if,  any form of a compensatory system can be extended throughout all college 
sports, and not those who just compete at the FBS level. Lastly, outside variables such as state 
spending on higher education could also provide valuable insight into other factors that have an 
effect on athletic revenue.  
This paper has helped provide a valuable insight into which sports athletic departments 
generate their revenue from, despite the limitations presented by university accounting practices. 
The results produced help reinforce the belief that football and basketball are the “cash cows” of 
college sports. At the same time, we were also able to learn that athletic aid given to women has 
a positive effect on total revenue, in addition to money spent on recruiting. I believe that these 
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Appendix 
 reg totlrev bsblrev mbsktblrev wbsktblrev mtrackrev wtrackrev ftblrev sftblrev  bigprogram i.statename, robust 
 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 73 
     F( 26, 32) = .  
     Prob > F = .  
     R-squared = 0.9685 
     Root MSE =      1.2e​+07 
           
  Robust         
totlrev Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
          
bsblrev 2.464813 2.080648 1.18 0.245  -1.773328  6.702955  
mbsktblrev .8927484 .4013846 2.22 0.033  .0751548  1.710342  
wbsktblrev 1.032877 .5936061 1.74 0.091  -.1762594  2.242013  
mtrackrev 6.314711 10.03363 0.63 0.534  -14.12313  26.75255  
wtrackrev -1.742976 8.835402 -0.20 0.845  -19.7401  16.25415  
ftblrev 1.013865 .1219127 8.32 0.000  .7655373  1.262193  
sftblrev -3.229688 10.12638 -0.32 0.752  -23.85644  17.39707  
bigprogram 1.87e+07 8547708 2.18 0.037  1246639  3.61e+07 
statename -9679621 1.24e+07 -0.78 0.439  -3.49e+07  1.55e+07 
AR   
AZ -1.03e+07 1.58e+07 -0.65 0.521  -4.25e+07  2.20e+07 
CA -1185512 1.04e+07 -0.11 0.910  -2.24e+07  2.00e+07 
CT -1.30e+07 1.15e+07 -1.13 0.267  -3.65e+07  1.05e+07 
FL -5016245 1.04e+07 -0.48 0.633  -2.62e+07  1.62e+07 
GA 690234.1 1.26e+07 0.05 0.956  -2.49e+07  2.63e+07 
IA 1.22e+07 9173030 1.33 0.191  -6441557  3.09e+07 
IL -1.16e+07 9655618 -1.20 0.238  -3.13e+07  8053042  
IN -3253772 1.20e+07 -0.27 0.787  -2.76e+07  2.11e+07 
KS 8056900 1.02e+07 0.79 0.435  -1.27e+07  2.88e+07 
KY -175528.7 1.70e+07 -0.01 0.992  -3.48e+07  3.45e+07 
LA -1.38e+07 1.02e+07 -1.35 0.186  -3.47e+07  7035441  
MA 6246200 1.27e+07 0.49 0.625  -1.95e+07  3.20e+07 
MI -1.01e+07 9890623 -1.02 0.316  -3.02e+07  1.01e+07 
MN 1555080 8713668 0.18 0.859  -1.62e+07  1.93e+07 
MO -1876071 1.29e+07 -0.15 0.885  -2.81e+07  2.44e+07 
MS -1.94e+07 1.47e+07 -1.32 0.196  -4.92e+07  1.05e+07 
NC -1.19e+07 1.04e+07 -1.15 0.260  -3.31e+07  9255391  
NE -9999687 8383863 -1.19 0.242  -2.71e+07  7077684  
NJ -6416157 1.08e+07 -0.60 0.556  -2.84e+07  1.55e+07 
NM -5900128 1.05e+07 -0.56 0.577  -2.72e+07  1.54e+07 
NY -4260269 9254743 -0.46 0.648  -2.31e+07  1.46e+07 
OH 3545443 1.51e+07 0.23 0.816  -2.73e+07  3.44e+07 
OK -7146226 8643095 -0.83 0.414  -2.48e+07  1.05e+07 
OR -2.17e+07 7783470 -2.79 0.009  -3.76e+07  -5882140 
PA -6976925 1.54e+07 -0.45 0.654  -3.83e+07  2.44e+07 
SC 7253028 1.30e+07 0.56 0.580  -1.92e+07  3.37e+07 
TN -1.73e+07 1.36e+07 -1.27 0.212  -4.49e+07  1.03e+07 
TX -9323959 1.05e+07 -0.89 0.381  -3.07e+07  1.21e+07 
UT -3663984 1.14e+07 -0.32 0.750  -2.69e+07  1.96e+07 
VA -1.18e+07 1.94e+07 -0.61 0.548  -5.13e+07  2.78e+07 
WA -5054537 7566706 -0.67 0.509  -2.05e+07  1.04e+07 
_cons 2.43e+07 1.00e+07 2.42 0.021  3879607  4.47e+07 
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reg totlrev bsblrev mbsktblrev wbsktblrev mtrackrev wtrackrev ftblrev sftblrev bigprogram menaid womenaid 
i.statename 
       
Source  SS df  MS  Number of obs = 73 
   
        F( 42, 30) = 32.29          
Model  1.5000e+17 42 3.5713e+15  Prob > F  = 0.0000 
Residual  3.3179e+15 30 1.1060e+14  R-squared  = 0.9784 
        Adj R-squared = 0.9481         
Total  1.5331e+17 72 2.1294e+15  Root MSE  =     1.1e​+07 
        
totlrev  Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
          
bsblrev  3.984103 1.737466 2.29 0.029 .4357246  7.53248 
mbsktblrev  .6447254 .3381495 1.91 0.066 -.045868  1.335319  
wbsktblrev  .0812919 .6589743 0.12 0.903 -1.264513  1.427097  
mtrackrev  12.1756 8.482374 1.44 0.162 -5.147723  29.49892  
wtrackrev  -11.52746 8.185506 -1.41 0.169 -28.2445  5.189569  
ftblrev  .8620323 .1079864 7.98 0.000 .6414947  1.08257 
sftblrev  .8747967 8.366339 0.10 0.917 -16.21155  17.96114  
bigprogram  1.22e+07 7814249 1.56 0.130 -3790829  2.81e+07 
menaid  -3.706316 2.662806 -1.39 0.174 -9.144493  1.73186 
womenaid  8.431184 3.00899 2.80 0.009 2.286007  14.57636  
statename  -9230578 1.45e+07 -0.64 0.529 -3.88e+07  2.04e+07 
AR   
AZ  -1.64e+07 1.09e+07 -1.50 0.144 -3.88e+07  5919567  
CA  -1.30e+07 1.00e+07 -1.30 0.204 -3.34e+07  7442246  
CT  -2.48e+07 1.45e+07 -1.70 0.099 -5.45e+07  4920391  
FL  -6992144 9014698 -0.78 0.444 -2.54e+07  1.14e+07 
GA  321069.2 1.08e+07 0.03 0.977 -2.18e+07  2.24e+07 
IA  842803.4 1.38e+07 0.06 0.952 -2.73e+07  2.90e+07 
IL  -1.12e+07 1.35e+07 -0.83 0.412 -3.87e+07  1.63e+07 
IN  -4371578 1.05e+07 -0.42 0.679 -2.57e+07  1.70e+07 
KS  3002495 1.36e+07 0.22 0.827 -2.48e+07  3.08e+07 
KY  1435215 1.12e+07 0.13 0.899 -2.15e+07  2.43e+07 
LA  -1.96e+07 9438270 -2.07 0.047 -3.88e+07 -297924.5  
MA  -1.02e+07 1.19e+07 -0.86 0.398 -3.44e+07  1.41e+07 
MI  -2.11e+07 9196983 -2.30 0.029 -3.99e+07  -2348249 
MN  301956.7 1.30e+07 0.02 0.982 -2.63e+07  2.69e+07 
MO  -3616053 1.41e+07 -0.26 0.800 -3.25e+07  2.53e+07 
MS  -1.78e+07 1.19e+07 -1.51 0.143 -4.21e+07  6358591  
NC  -1.20e+07 8733556 -1.37 0.180 -2.98e+07  5841244  
NE  -9006507 1.29e+07 -0.70 0.491 -3.54e+07  1.74e+07 
NJ  -1.94e+07 1.42e+07 -1.36 0.183 -4.84e+07  9642166  
NM  -6530069 1.32e+07 -0.50 0.624 -3.35e+07  2.04e+07 
NY  -8983231 1.29e+07 -0.70 0.490 -3.52e+07  1.73e+07 
OH  -5803088 9466657 -0.61 0.544 -2.51e+07  1.35e+07 
OK  3253177 1.05e+07 0.31 0.759 -1.82e+07  2.47e+07 
OR  -2.47e+07 1.28e+07 -1.93 0.063 -5.08e+07  1405806  
PA  -4978454 1.10e+07 -0.45 0.656 -2.75e+07  1.76e+07 
SC  2951935 1.49e+07 0.20 0.844 -2.74e+07  3.33e+07 
TN  -1.50e+07 9251008 -1.62 0.116 -3.39e+07  3932696  
TX  -8988504 8284472 -1.08 0.287 -2.59e+07  7930646  
UT  -4422614 1.15e+07 -0.38 0.704 -2.80e+07  1.91e+07 
VA  -2.04e+07 1.20e+07 -1.71 0.098 -4.49e+07  3975856  
WA  1595262 1.26e+07 0.13 0.900 -2.41e+07  2.73e+07 
_cons  2.24e+07 9458841 2.37 0.025 3056983  4.17e+07 
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reg totlrev bsblrev mbsktblrev wbsktblrev mtrackrev wtrackrev ftblrev sftblrev menexp womenexp bigprogram 
i.statename, robust 
         
Linear regression    Number of obs = 73 
     F( 28, 30) = . 
     Prob > F = .  
     R-squared = 0.9835 
     Root MSE = 9.2e​+06 
           
  Robust         
totlrev Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
          
bsblrev 1.982513 1.875637 1.06 0.299  -1.848048  5.813074 
mbsktblrev .5275958 .2634922 2.00 0.054  -.0105271  1.065719 
wbsktblrev .5628798 .466794 1.21 0.237  -.3904406  1.5162 
mtrackrev 5.074985 8.336026 0.61 0.547  -11.94945  22.09942 
wtrackrev -9.600244 7.922416 -1.21 0.235  -25.77998  6.579487 
ftblrev .551633 .1599087 3.45 0.002  .2250558  .8782102 
sftblrev 2.20703 5.948059 0.37 0.713  -9.940528  14.35459 
menexp .5065691 .4237686 1.20 0.241  -.3588818  1.37202 
womenexp 2.327161 .9712483 2.40 0.023  .3436077  4.310715 
bigprogram 1845236 9306560 0.20 0.844  -1.72e+07     2.09e+07 
statename 






AR    
AZ -1.23e+07 7486366 -1.64 0.112  -2.76e+07  3026315  
CA -1.07e+07 8447866 -1.27 0.213  -2.80e+07  6508516  
CT -2.38e+07 1.09e+07 -2.18 0.037  -4.62e+07  -1476543 
FL -3424431 8065700 -0.42 0.674  -1.99e+07  1.30e+07 
GA 3955933 1.90e+07 0.21 0.836  -3.48e+07  4.27e+07 
IA 3630116 7374289 0.49 0.626  -1.14e+07  1.87e+07 
IL -8059032 6889169 -1.17 0.251  -2.21e+07  6010528  
IN -5220056 9505862 -0.55 0.587  -2.46e+07  1.42e+07 
KS 7857276 8940903 0.88 0.386  -1.04e+07  2.61e+07 
KY -2605446 9859984 -0.26 0.793  -2.27e+07  1.75e+07 
LA -8411115 7526858 -1.12 0.273  -2.38e+07  6960779  
MA -8269357 8793908 -0.94 0.355  -2.62e+07  9690199  
MI -1.21e+07 7832285 -1.55 0.132  -2.81e+07  3882992  
MN -9124035 6965463 -1.31 0.200  -2.33e+07  5101338  
MO 357117 1.05e+07 0.03 0.973  -2.12e+07  2.19e+07 
MS -1.01e+07 1.44e+07 -0.70 0.489  -3.95e+07  1.93e+07 
NC -5519370 7037623 -0.78 0.439  -1.99e+07  8853374  
NE -1.12e+07 6362084 -1.76 0.088  -2.42e+07  1777112  
NJ -1.11e+07 9256355 -1.20 0.239  -3.00e+07  7782228  
NM -6775379 6855854 -0.99 0.331  -2.08e+07  7226143  
NY -3335773 6977166 -0.48 0.636  -1.76e+07  1.09e+07 
OH -1866699 1.01e+07 -0.18 0.855  -2.26e+07  1.88e+07 
OK 2572897 7535296 0.34 0.735  -1.28e+07  1.80e+07 
OR -1.69e+07 6911899 -2.44 0.021  -3.10e+07  -2754028 
PA -3432042 9592547 -0.36 0.723  -2.30e+07  1.62e+07 
SC -785714.1 9885898 -0.08 0.937  -2.10e+07  1.94e+07 
TN -1.05e+07 7443915 -1.41 0.168  -2.57e+07  4679930  
TX -8272587 8540868 -0.97 0.340  -2.57e+07  9170192  
UT -5738861 7981031 -0.72 0.478  -2.20e+07  1.06e+07 
VA -1.45e+07 1.12e+07 -1.29 0.207  -3.75e+07   8476878 
WA            -4898431 7573779       -0.65 0.523             -2.04e+07  
 
1.06e+07  











reg totlrev bsblrev mbsktblrev wbsktblrev mtrackrev wtrackrev ftblrev sftblrev  
mensrecruit womensrecruit bigprogram i.statename, robust 
Linear regression Number of obs = 73 
      F( 28, 30) = . 
      Prob > F = . 
      R-squared = 0.9734 
      Root MSE = 1.2e​+07 
           
   Robust        
totlrev  Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
          
bsblrev  3.097699 1.925987 1.61 0.118  -.8356902  7.031088 
mbsktblrev  .8139074 .3536209 2.30 0.028  .0917171  1.536098 
wbsktblrev  .9853954 .5893317 1.67 0.105  -.2181805  2.188971 
mtrackrev  7.326896 10.33643 0.71 0.484  -13.78292  28.43671 
wtrackrev  -2.008992 8.66085 -0.23 0.818  -19.69681  15.67882 
ftblrev  .9101598 .1614192 5.64 0.000  .5804977  1.239822 
sftblrev  -5.905633 9.070351 -0.65 0.520  -24.42976  12.61849 
mensrecruit  1.599372 11.26051 0.14 0.888  -21.39766  24.59641 
womensrecruit  49.16045 29.37062 1.67 0.105  -10.82235  109.1433 
bigprogram  4064619 8642634 0.47 0.642  -1.36e+07  2.17e+07
          statename  




7962878 AR    
AZ  -8881512 1.61e+07 -0.55 0.585  -4.17e+07  2.40e+07
CA  1736273 9977642 0.17 0.863  -1.86e+07  2.21e+07
CT  -7733489 1.11e+07 -0.69 0.493  -3.05e+07  1.50e+07
FL  -9202344 1.10e+07 -0.84 0.408  -3.16e+07  1.32e+07
GA  -8655041 1.58e+07 -0.55 0.589  -4.10e+07  2.37e+07
IA  1.10e+07 9456072 1.17 0.252  -8273910  3.03e+07
IL  -1.04e+07 1.15e+07 -0.91 0.369  -3.38e+07  1.30e+07
IN  -1779499 1.26e+07 -0.14 0.889  -2.76e+07  2.40e+07
KS  2358133 1.13e+07 0.21 0.836  -2.07e+07  2.54e+07
KY  -8003625 1.21e+07 -0.66 0.514  -3.28e+07  1.68e+07
LA  -1.30e+07 9642155 -1.35 0.186  -3.27e+07  6648076 
MA  -9172.745 1.42e+07 -0.00 0.999  -2.89e+07  2.89e+07
MI  -1.23e+07 9135653 -1.35 0.188  -3.10e+07  6335605 
MN  2119998 9038525 0.23 0.816  -1.63e+07  2.06e+07
MO  616393.5 1.20e+07 0.05 0.959  -2.40e+07  2.52e+07
MS  -1.95e+07 1.38e+07 -1.41 0.170  -4.77e+07  8804051 
NC  -1.33e+07 1.02e+07 -1.30 0.204  -3.41e+07  7584635 
NE  -1.65e+07 9748217 -1.69 0.101  -3.64e+07  3432035 
NJ  -7030906 1.13e+07 -0.62 0.540  -3.02e+07  1.61e+07
NM  -8628886 1.02e+07 -0.84 0.406  -2.96e+07  1.23e+07
NY  -7081462 9264172 -0.76 0.451  -2.60e+07  1.18e+07
OH  -360647.6 1.28e+07 -0.03 0.978  -2.65e+07  2.58e+07
OK  -4120454 8351614 -0.49 0.625  -2.12e+07  1.29e+07
OR  -1.58e+07 8777502 -1.80 0.082  -3.37e+07  2155222 
PA  -5773773 1.63e+07 -0.35 0.726  -3.91e+07  2.76e+07
SC  2476348 1.27e+07 0.20 0.846  -2.34e+07  2.83e+07
TN  -1.84e+07 1.32e+07 -1.39 0.175  -4.54e+07  8628111 
TX  -1.19e+07 1.08e+07 -1.11 0.278  -3.39e+07  1.01e+07
UT  -8089751 1.12e+07 -0.72 0.477  -3.10e+07  1.49e+07
VA  -9293373 1.88e+07 -0.49 0.625  -4.78e+07  2.92e+07
WA  2816985 9745134 0.29 0.775  -1.71e+07  2.27e+07
_cons  1.95e+07 1.01e+07 1.94 0.062  -1020559  4.01e+07
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